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Beyond the End of History: The Need 
for a ‘Radical Historicisation’ of 
Democracy in International Relations
Christopher Hobson
To properly comprehend democracy’s present and future role in 
politics, particularly in regards to processes of democratisation and 
democracy promotion, we must cultivate a more nuanced reading of 
democracy’s past. Needed is ‘a radical historicisation of democracy’, 
in Frank Ankersmit’s words, which foregrounds that democracy is 
a contingent historical fact, necessarily conditioned by its past. This 
position is contrasted to the standard account of democracy and its 
history provided by liberalism. Rather than comfortably accepting 
the current prominence of liberal democracy and the widespread nor-
mative agreement on this form of rule, this article instead considers 
the much longer tradition of thought which regarded democracy as 
something negative and very distinct from liberalism. In so doing, a 
sensitive reading of democracy’s past promotes a much more reflex-
ive position, which opens space for considering whether the pres-
ent state of affairs is actually much less secure and more fragile than 
many liberal proponents of democracy tend to suggest. At the same 
time, this approach also points the way towards a more considered 
case for democracy.
Keywords: democracy, democracy promotion, democratisation, end of history, liberalism
Introduction1
If you establish democracy, you must in due 
time reap the fruits of a democracy.
Benjamin Disraeli (1850)
Disraeli’s observation is one that the current British Prime Minister would 
surely agree with. Where the two would diverge is over what exactly 
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these ‘fruits’ are. For the present-day leader, it would no doubt entail 
a mixture of goods; such as freedom, liberty, stability, a greater level of 
international peace and a range of other positives that are said to derive 
from government being based on the consent of the people. Disraeli, how-
ever, was not particularly keen on reaping democracy’s harvest, which 
he viewed as consisting of rotten fruit. The above quote continues:
You will in due season have wars entered into from passion and not from 
reason; and you will in due season submit to peace ignominiously sought 
ignominiously obtained, which will diminish your authority and perhaps 
endanger your independence. You will in due season find your property is 
less valuable, and our freedom less complete.2
For the majority of democracy’s past, opinion has generally sided with 
Disraeli. The now widespread agreement over the normative desirabil-
ity and political legitimacy of democracy is noticeably different from 
the historically dominant understanding that regarded it as a dan-
gerous and unstable form of rule which inevitably led to anarchy or 
 despotism.
That a positive dynamic between democracy and liberty exists is now 
broadly accepted, and liberal democracy has become the pre-eminent 
form of domestic governance in the post-Cold War international order. 
Democracy, according to Amartya Sen, is a ‘universal value’.3 The increas-
ingly widespread agreement on democracy has led, however, to the his-
torically more prevalent viewpoint – represented by Disraeli’s judgement 
above – being disregarded or lost. As part of this history of forgetting, 
it is a liberal vision that largely structures our mental horizons of what 
democracy is and can be. With the final collapse of the people’s and one 
party models of democracy in the 1980s, liberal democracy emerged as 
dominant, almost by default.4 For many observers, though, the defeat of 
communism did, indeed, signal the vindication of this particular model. 
Fukuyama boldly proposed that:
to the Department of International Relations, Australian National University 
in August 2008. As well as the participants at this seminar and the Millennium 
Conference, I would like to acknowledge Raymond Apthorpe, Peter Chambers, 
Murielle Cozette, John Dryzek, Milja Kurki and the Millennium Editors and 
reviewers for their helpful feedback. Special thanks to John Keane for his ongo-
ing engagement and discussion on these issues.
2. Thomas Curson Hansard, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, Volume 
153 (London: Cornelius Buck, 1859), 1245.
3. Amartya Sen, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’, Journal of Democracy 10, no. 
3 (1999): 3–17. See also: Carl Gershman, ‘Democracy as Policy Goal and Universal 
Value’, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 6, no. 1 (2005): 
19–38.
4. Adam Burgess, ‘Universal Democracy, Diminished Expectation’, Democrati-
zation 8, no. 3 (2001): 51–74, 59–63.
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What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the 
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history 
as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government.5
In this reading, the majority of democracy’s long and rather negative 
past is downplayed or ignored completely, as a Whiggish narrative of 
democratic progress and expansion is constructed. This is represen-
tative of a more general tendency by liberal scholars to conceive of 
democracy in universal terms, abstracting democracy from its history 
and, in so doing, regarding it as something relatively unproblematic 
and settled.
The argument of this article is that to properly comprehend democ-
racy’s present and future role in politics, particularly in regards to pro-
cesses of democratisation and democracy promotion, we must cultivate 
a much deeper and more nuanced reading of democracy’s past. Needed 
is ‘a radical historicisation of democracy’, in Frank Ankersmit’s words, 
which foregrounds that democracy is a contingent historical fact, and far 
from inevitable.6 This position inverts the standard reading of democracy 
and its history provided by liberalism. Rather than comfortably accept-
ing the current prominence of liberal democracy and the widespread 
normative agreement on this form of rule, this article instead consid-
ers the much longer tradition of thought which regarded democracy as 
something negative and very distinct from liberalism. In so doing, the 
approach taken here highlights the historical contingency of the current 
democratic moment. It is argued that a sensitive reading of democracy’s 
past promotes a much more reflexive position, which opens up space 
for considering whether the present state of affairs is actually much less 
secure than many proponents presume. At the same time, it also points 
the way towards a more considered case for democracy.
The argument will proceed as follows: first, democracy’s current loca-
tion in international relations will be considered, focusing on the liberal 
argument that democracy is universal as a value, and increasing also in 
practice. Second, it is suggested that the liberal interpretation provides a 
version of democracy’s history that downplays or excludes the vast major-
ity of its past, much of which largely contradicts this progressive account. 
Building on these observations an alternative reading of democracy’s his-
tory is presented, one which explores the historically conditioned nature 
of both the liberal democratic model and democracy’s present normative 
positioning. In the penultimate section, a reconsideration of democracy 
5. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest 16 (1989): 
3–18, 3.
6. Frank Ankersmit, Political Representation (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 10–11.
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in light of this ‘radical historicisation’ will be undertaken, noting that 
it points towards a more cautious stance, highly cognisant of the limits 
and fragility of democracy. In concluding, the consequences of the argu-
ment for understanding democracy’s role in contemporary politics will 
be considered.
Democracy at the ‘End of History’
A defining feature of the post-Cold War era has been the ideational 
ascendancy of democracy. Reflecting on this, Larry Diamond observed 
that democracy ‘came during the 1990s to be a global phenomenon, the 
predominant form of government, and the only broadly legitimate 
form of government in the world’.7 Writing as the United Nations 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, reached a similar conclusion: ‘democ-
racy is more widely accepted and practiced today than ever before’.8 
Continually growing acknowledgment, appreciation and institution of 
democracy across the globe suggests that it may be truly universal, and 
has increasingly come to be seen as a mark of a civilised state in the 
21st-century international order.9 Michael Mandelbaum has recently 
described this state of affairs in particularly strong terms: ‘the most 
important, and most hopeful, political fact of the twenty-first century 
is that the rise of democracy is the rule, while the risks its rise poses are 
the exception’.10
In the speeches and thought of world leaders, policy makers and 
observers, democracy is regularly equated with lofty ideals like free-
dom, liberty and equality. A particularly clear and significant case 
of this is found in the language of George W. Bush. A representative 
example of the laudatory manner in which he perceives democracy 
is seen in this speech on the importance of freedom in the Middle 
East:
The United States appreciates that democratic progress requires tough 
choices. Our own history teaches us that the road to freedom is not always 
even, and democracy does not come overnight. Yet we also know that for 
all the difficulties, a society based on liberty is worth the sacrifice. We know 
that democracy is the only form of government that treats individuals with 
the dignity and equality that is their right. We know from experience that 
7. Larry Diamond, ‘Universal Democracy?’, Policy Review, no. 119 (June 
2003), <http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/diamond_print.html>, accessed 
10/8/04.
8. Kofi Annan, ‘“In Larger Freedom”: Decision Time at the UN’, Foreign Affairs 
84, no. 3 (2005): 63–74.
9. Christopher Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilisation’, Global Society 22, no. 1 
(2008): 75–95.
10. Michael Mandelbaum, Democracy’s Good Name (New York: Public Affairs, 
2007), xiv.
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democracy is the only system of government that yields lasting peace and 
stability.11
This strong belief that democracy is the form of government most 
capable of providing the good life for individuals is perhaps one of 
the few things many would be willing to agree with Bush on. One 
could continue listing examples, but the basic point, namely, that there 
has been a remarkable consensus over the normative and  political 
 desirability of democracy in the post-Cold War world, is relatively 
uncontroversial.
The above quote from Bush also reveals a very distinct understand-
ing of the relationship between democracy and history. It is a teleologi-
cal conception, whereby historical change has an underlying logic or 
purpose to it, and an ultimate end point can be identified and poten-
tially reached. This understanding is by no means limited to Bush; it has 
been a hallmark of many liberal scholars and practitioners that actively 
 support and advocate liberal democracy. Fukuyama provides the clear-
est enunciation of this position.12 He proposes that, ‘there is a funda-
mental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern 
for all human societies – in short, something like a Universal History of 
mankind in the direction of liberal democracy’.13 While the triumphalist 
 narrative of Fukuyama has been heavily critiqued, it would be a mistake 
to discount this thesis. Few have agreed wholesale with the argument, 
but many continue to accept it in a qualified form, with his assertion of 
liberal democracy’s superiority resonating especially widely.14 Indeed, 
as Žižek observes, ‘it is easy to make fun of  Fukuyama’s notion of 
the End of History, but the dominant ethos today is “Fukuyamaian”: 
 liberal-democratic capitalism is accepted as the finally found formula 
of the best possible society’.15 
Marks usefully categorises Fukuyama as the standard-bearer of a 
prominent movement she terms ‘liberal millenarianism’. The defining 
characteristics of this position are: (1) a teleological conception of his-
tory, (2) an understanding that this telos is liberal democracy, (3) a belief 
that ‘we’, the West, have essentially reached this end point of  liberal 
democracy, in comparison to a non-liberal ‘they’ that have yet to prog-
ress, and (4) an overriding sense of optimism and confidence about 
11. George W. Bush, ‘The Importance of Freedom in the Middle East’, 13/1/08, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080113–1.html>, 
accessed 25/7/08.
12. Another very clear example is found in the work of Michael Mandelbaum.
13. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 
1992), 48.
14. Susan Marks, ‘International Law, Democracy and the End of History’, in 
Democratic Governance and International Law, eds. Gregory Fox and Brad Roth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 532–66, 534–5.
15. Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008), 421.
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democracy’s present and future.16 Marks identifies this perspective with 
three  eminent international legal scholars,17 but liberal millenarianism 
extends much further, and is notably found in the works of some of the 
most prominent thinkers on democratisation, Democratic Peace Theory 
and democracy promotion.18 What makes this movement all the more 
significant is precisely the close links that exist between the academic and 
policy-making realms when it comes to democratisation and democracy 
promotion.19 This has been most recently evidenced in the thinking and 
practice of the Bush administration and their neo-conservative backers, 
which placed the promotion of democracy abroad at the heart of their 
foreign policy agenda. Tony Smith has strongly argued that the liberal 
millenarian position particularly influential in shaping and giving justi-
fication to the ‘liberal imperialism’ of the Bush Administration.20
For liberal millenarians – academics and policy-makers alike – 
democracy’s merits and universality are taken to be demonstrated 
both normatively and empirically. In terms of its normative valid-
ity, ‘democracy’, in George W. Bush’s words, ‘leads to a better life’.21 
Liberal democracy is seen as the form of government most capable of 
providing freedom,  liberty, stability and equality, amongst other ben-
efits. Robert Dahl comes up with a condensed list of ten desirable con-
sequences of democracy: ‘(1) avoiding tyranny, (2) essential rights, (3) 
general freedom, (4) self  determination, (5) moral autonomy, (6) human 
16. Marks, ‘International Law, Democracy and the End of History’, 538–9.
17. Thomas Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, The 
 American Journal of International Law 86, no. 1 (1992): 46–91; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, European Journal of International 
Law 6, no. 1 (1995): 503–31; Fernando Tesón, ‘The Kantian Theory of International 
Law’, Colorado Law Review 92, no. 1 (1992): 53–102.
18. Some of the most notable examples are: Larry Diamond, The Spirit of 
 Democracy (New York: Times Books, 2008), Marc Plattner, Democracy Without 
Borders? Global Challenges to Liberal Democracy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2007), and Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a 
Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
19. To take an important case, in 2004 Larry Diamond went to Iraq as a senior 
advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority, after the American overthrow of 
the Baathist regime. On the relationship between academia and policy-making in 
regards to democratisation and democracy promotion, see: Nicolas Guilhot, The 
Democracy Makers: Human Rights and International Order (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 2005); William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13–72.
20. Tony Smith, A Pact with the Devil (New York: Routledge, 2007). See also: Piki 
Ish-Shalom, ‘“The Civilization of Clashes”: Misapplying the Democratic Peace in 
the Middle East’, Political Science Quarterly, 122, no. 4 (2007–8): 533–54.
21. George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, 28/1/08, <http://www.white-
house.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128–13.html>, accessed 25/7/08.
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 development, (7)  protecting essential personal interests (8) political 
equality … (9) peace-seeking, (10) prosperity’.22 
The arguments of Democratic Peace Theory suggest that many of the 
characteristics and advantages of liberal democracy, notably the empha-
sis placed on the rule of law, cooperation and the peaceful resolution 
of political differences, are extended to their international behaviour. 
These strong normative grounds are closely linked to empirical claims 
that existing liberal democracies provide these goods, in either absolute 
or relative terms, at both the domestic and international levels. More-
over, the spread of liberal democracy beyond Western confines is taken 
as evidence that it is something which transcends cultural boundaries. 
Cited are opinion polls, such as the Pew Center and Barometer surveys, 
which indicate that democracy is the preferred form of government in all 
regions of the world.23 In this sense, the demand for democracy is seen 
as universal. Increasingly so is the supply, according to trends mapped 
in the prominent Freedom House and Polity data sets on democracy. 
Both show a slow, but nevertheless clear, movement towards democracy 
across the globe over the last century.24 This trend became more notice-
able with the third wave of democratisation, which swept across much of 
the world from the 1970s to 1990s. The breadth of the third wave is seen 
as further proof that the desire for, and possibility of, this form of govern-
ment is universal.25 In this liberal reading, democracy may have emerged 
from a historically and culturally specific context, but it has transcended 
those localised beginnings and can be regarded as truly universal in its 
aspirations, scope and applicability.26
A ‘Radical Historicisation’ of Democracy
In the dominant liberal millenarian vision universalised is a historically 
specific understanding of what democracy is and should be,  underwritten 
by a teleological reading of its past that seeks to validate this truth claim. 
By positioning democracy in such a manner, much of its past is lost or 
downplayed, as a narrative of linear progress is constructed. Indeed, one 
of the most significant dimensions of democracy in world politics today 
is the extent to which the Whig reading of its history, as  exemplified 
22. Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 45.
23. Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 32–3.
24. For Freedom House, see: <http://www.freedomhouse.org> and for 
Polity, see: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>, accessed 
4/9/08.
25. This is argued by Gershman, ‘Democracy as Policy Goal and Universal 
Value’, 20–22; Michael McFaul, ‘Democracy Promotion as a World Value’, The 
Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2004–5), 147–63.
26. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 51; Diamond, The Spirit of 
Democracy.
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by – though crucially not limited to – the liberal  millenarians, has been 
naturalised, and the basic idea of democracy as a good goes unques-
tioned. As Ankersmit observes, ‘since we are all democrats (or so one 
may hope!), we tend to see democracy as the fulfillment of our politi-
cal destiny and as the political system that will remain with us for the 
rest of human history’.27 There is, however, nothing fixed or eternal 
about democracy, or any other method of governing for that matter. In 
previous epochs it was religious or monarchic conceptions that domi-
nated understandings about the way people were ruled; today these are 
anachronisms that have long since disappeared from our worldview. In 
much the same way, there is nothing in democracy’s current positioning 
to suggest that it will inevitably endure. Even if liberal democracy rep-
resents the only viable state form at present – a highly contentious claim 
– in itself this does not preclude the possibility that non-democratic or 
post-democratic alternatives will emerge in the future. The liberal mille-
narian framework, however, is one that restricts our ability to recognise 
these kinds of changes.
To combat this self-defeating tendency of conceiving of democracy in 
abstracted, universal terms, needed is a ‘radical historicisation’ of democ-
racy which consciously foregrounds its historically specific and condi-
tioned nature. Ankersmit explains the consequences from adopting this 
alternative approach:
On the one hand, it obviously entails a relativisation of democracy: we should 
not see it as the epiphany of the ultimate political Truth, as we so often tend 
to do. On the other hand, such thinking may stimulate a more realistic atti-
tude toward democracy than customarily is the case, an attitude that may 
be more beneficial to the cause of democracy than ahistoricist adoration and 
blind glorification.28
Building on Ankersmit’s insights, it is argued here that such a position is 
able to better comprehend the contemporary nature of democracy, as it 
recognises that it is not just liberal democracy which is historically con-
tingent, but also the normative agreement on democracy as being some-
thing valuable.
It is time to break free of the liberal straightjacket that constrains our 
mental horizons for understanding democracy. To demonstrate this 
 central claim, a conceptual history of democracy will be sketched in 
two parts.29 First, the liberal democratic model will be considered, and, 
second, the historical development of the present normative consensus 
27. Ankersmit, Political Representation, 10–11.
28. Ibid., 11.
29. The approach adopted here consciously argues against trying to define or 
fix democracy’s meaning. As Nietzsche so eloquently put it, ‘only that which has 
no history is definable’. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce 
Homo (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 80.
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on democracy will be explored. In so doing, this argument is motivated 
by Quentin Skinner’s important suggestion that:
The intellectual historian can help us appreciate how far the values embod-
ied in our present way of life, and our present ways of thinking about those 
values, reflect a series of choices made at different times between different 
possible worlds. This awareness can help to liberate us from the grip of any 
one hegemonal account of those values and how they should be interpreted 
and understood. Equipped with a broader sense of possibility, we can stand 
back from the intellectual commitments we have inherited and ask ourselves 
in a new spirit of enquiry what we should think of them.30
With this in mind, recovering the way the concept of democracy has 
changed and shifted over time points to there being nothing essential 
or universal in its present shape and meaning, especially in terms of the 
strongly positive normative connotations that currently surround it. In 
addition, it highlights that the liberal model now dominant is not natural, 
but was born of historical contingencies, and as circumstances change it 
could be superseded or disappear, if this process has not already begun.
Liberal Democracy: Liberalism and Democracy
I passionately love liberty, the rule of law, 
and respect for rights, but not democracy.
Alexis de Tocqueville (1841)31
The present ideational dominance of the liberal democratic model and 
its powerful assertion of universality, backed by the hegemonic power 
of the United States and other liberal democracies, means it is of great 
importance to appreciate its historical specificity. Liberal democracy is 
of relatively recent vintage, emerging in the 19th century in the United 
States and Western Europe. Before their unlikely marriage, liberalism 
and democracy were historically distinct and separate doctrines, respec-
tively concerned with liberty and equality. In this regard, liberalism and 
democracy each took a different emphasis from the banner of the French 
 Revolution – ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’.32 Schmitt extends this distinc-
tion further to a separation in theory between ‘liberal individualism’ 
and ‘democratic homogeneity’, but notes that ‘modern mass democracy 
30. Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 116–17.
31. Quoted in Luciano Canfora, Democracy in Europe: A History of an Ideology, 
trans. Simon Jones (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 18–19.
32. Both rest, to a certain extent, on underspecified ideas of ‘fraternité’, where 
some kind of nation or defined group is largely taken as a given. On this, 
see: Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1996).
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rests on the confused combination of both’.33 This ‘confusion’ stems from 
democracy and liberalism sharing the same starting point – the  individual 
– and the associated belief in basic political rights.34 Nonetheless, ‘while 
both liberalism and democracy are individualistic conceptions, the 
 individual of the former is not the same as the individual of the latter’.35 
Put crudely, liberalism’s individual is essentially atomistic, whereas 
democracy’s individual is more directly societal. The shared emphasis on 
popular sovereignty and consent represents a point of convergence, but 
the consequences of the two doctrines can be contradictory. The initial, if 
somewhat banal, conclusion to be drawn is that the relationship between 
liberalism and democracy is highly complex, open to multiple variations 
and interpretations.
Given that liberalism and democracy are – historically and 
 theoretically – distinct, this immediately suggests that liberal democracy 
is far from being a logical, let alone necessary, form. At first glance the 
potentially conflicting concerns with liberty and equality would seem 
to work against the combining of liberalism and democracy. In this 
regard,  Bobbio  usefully identifies three possible combinations between 
the two components that make up liberal democracy: (1) liberalism 
and democracy are compatible, (2) liberalism and democracy are anti-
thetical, and (3) liberalism and democracy are  necessarily interlinked.36 
Theoretically, it is the first of these that is the most plausible: democ-
racy and liberalism do share some similar concerns, and thus have the 
potential to combine, but this is not preordained. This differs, however, 
from the perspective  dominant in  liberal scholarship on democratisa-
tion and democracy  promotion, where it is the third relationship – one 
of necessity – that largely prevails. Editor of the influential Journal of 
Democracy, Marc Plattner,  proposes a ‘ profound kinship’ exists between 
the two, with the title of his article – ‘Liberalism and Democracy: Can’t 
Have One Without the Other’ –  indicating this position very clearly.37 
While acknowledging that they have been historically distinct, Plattner 
argues that the ‘underlying  principle of liberalism … that all human 
beings are by nature free and equal’ allows for a more egalitarian form of 
democracy than that found previously, and partly because of this, even 
if the two doctrines were separate in the past, they are now inextrica-
bly linked.38 Meanwhile, in Zakaria’s argument, against which Plattner 
33. Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 13, 17.
34. Norberto Bobbio, Liberalism and Democracy, trans. Martin Ryle and Kate 
Soper (London: Verso, 2005), 37–44; Marc Plattner, ‘Liberalism and Democracy: 
Can’t Have One Without the Other’, Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2 (1998): 171–80.
35. Bobbio, Liberalism and Democracy, 42.
36. Ibid., 48–9.
37. Plattner, ‘Liberalism and Democracy’, 173.
38. Ibid., 175.
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is reacting, liberalism and democracy are carefully distinguished, but 
his concern with ‘illiberal democracies’ is precisely that they are defi-
cient in one of the two ‘necessary’ components, namely, liberalism.39 
The underlying premise remains the same as in Plattner: liberalism and 
democracy are interlinked, with the debate ultimately being a technical 
one over ‘sequencing’.
Nineteenth-century liberals, in contrast, believed that there was noth-
ing inevitable or normal about this pairing of liberalism and democracy. 
Rather, it was the second relationship – one of  incompatibility – which 
prevailed in their thinking. Given the tendency by liberals today to 
 naturalise the liberal democratic model, it is instructive reflecting on 
the concerns of their predecessors, who greatly feared the advent of 
democracy. While liberals strongly advocated popular sovereignty 
against monarchy and aristocracy, this support generally did not 
extend to popular government. This was especially evident during the 
1848  Revolutions where liberals soon sided with conservatives against 
the more revolutionary socialists and communists who were associated 
with democratic demands. Reflecting on the events of 1848 in Paris, 
 Alexander Herzen acutely identified the halfway position of liberals: 
‘they want freedom and even a republic provided that it is confined to 
their own cultivated circle. Beyond the limits of their moderate circle 
they become conservatives’.40 This cautious response emerged from a 
concern that the  levelling instincts of democracy were a great threat to 
the liberties which had only just been wrestled from monarchs and aris-
tocrats. In this regard, Herbert Spencer announced that, ‘the function of 
Liberalism in the past was that of putting a limit to the powers of kings. 
The function of true Liberalism in the future will be that of putting a 
limit to the powers of Parliaments.’41 
The growing sense of democracy’s inevitably made liberals all the more 
worried about understanding, limiting and controlling it. Writing on the 
subject in the 1860s, Matthew Arnold observed that: ‘at the present time, 
almost everyone believes in the growth of democracy, almost everyone 
talks of it, almost everyone laments it’.42 Indeed, when  Tocqueville had 
earlier travelled to America, it was partly to assess whether the  ‘rising 
39. Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 
(1997): 22–43.
40. Quoted in Geoffrey Ellis, ‘The Revolution of 1848–1849 in France’, in The 
Revolutions in Europe 1848–1849: From Reform to Reaction, eds. R. J. W. Evans 
and Hartmut Pogge Von Strandmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
27–54, 49.
41. Quoted in Jens Christophersen, The Meaning of ‘Democracy’ as used in Euro-
pean Ideologies from the French to the Russian Revolution (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
1966), 174.
42. Quoted in Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of 
World Order, 1860–1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 31.
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tide’ of democracy would engulf Europe, or if it could be  managed.43 
The great concern of 19th-century liberals, arising from Cooper and 
 Tocqueville’s accounts of the American experience, was democracy’s 
perceived  susceptibility to the ‘tyranny of the majority’,44 whereby the 
rights of the minority would be sacrificed to the unrestrained will of the 
majority. Partly on these grounds liberals were against the institution of 
universal suffrage, seeing it as a grave threat to the basic liberties they 
held dear. Not only would a widespread franchise facilitate the poten-
tial destruction of constitutional barriers protecting individual rights, it 
would also result in the voices of the enlightened few being drowned out 
by the uneducated, and thus unenlightened, masses.
At the heart of liberal fears was the belief that in a democracy the 
 liberties of the individual would be sacrificed at the altar of equality. The 
rights of the minority would be subject to the caprice of the unrestrained 
majority, which, given the tremendous socio-economic changes taking 
place, would necessarily be the poorer, less educated working classes. 
Nineteenth-century liberals widely subscribed to Lord Acton’s (other) 
dictum that, ‘the effective distinction between liberty and democracy … 
cannot be too strongly drawn’.45 One of the clearest aims of Lecky’s two 
volume study, Democracy and Liberty, published in 1898, was to demon-
strate that ‘democracy is not liberty’.46 It is worth quoting Lecky at length, 
as he provides an excellent representation of the liberal position at the 
time:
strong arguments may be adduced, both from history and from the nature 
of things, to show that democracy may often prove the direct opposite of 
liberty.… Equality is the idol of democracy, but, with the infinitely various 
capabilities and energies of men, this can only be attained by a constant, 
systematic, stringent repression of their natural development. Whenever 
43. ‘Democracy is like a rising tide; it only recoils to come back with greater 
force, and soon one sees that for all its fluctuation it is always gaining ground. 
The immediate future of European society is completely democratic: this can in 
no way be doubted.’ Alexis de Tocqueville, Journeys to England and Ireland, ed. 
Jacob Peter Mayer (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), 67.
44. Tocqueville’s concerns were echoed by James Fenimore Cooper in The 
 American Democrat, published in 1838, two years before the second volume of 
Democracy in America. James Fenimore Cooper, The American Democrat (Cooper-
stown: H. & E. Phinney, 1838).
45. This comment was written in approval of the distinction drawn between the 
two concepts in Sir Thomas Erskine May’s classic, Democracy in Europe. Reflecting 
on the revolutions of 1848, May wrote: ‘from this critical year of revolutions the 
moral may be drawn that freedom is the surest safeguard against democracy’. 
Both quoted in Arne Naess, Jens Christophersen and Kjell Kvalø, Democracy, 
 Ideology and Objectivity (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1956), 127–8.
46. William Edward Hartpole Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, Volume 1 (London: 
Longmans, Greed and Co., 1899), 257.
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 natural forces have unrestricted play, inequality is certain to ensue. 
Democracy destroys the balance of opinions, interests, and classes, on 
which constitutional liberty mainly depends, and its constant tendency is 
to impair the efficiency and authority of parliaments, which have hitherto 
proved the chief organs of political liberty.47
The contradiction in the programme of 19th-century liberals was that 
the language used to claim and secure constitutions and liberal rights 
was couched in a universalist manner, which made it difficult to limit 
indefinitely calls for the extension of basic rights and the franchise. In this 
sense, the subsequent appearance of liberal democracy was not so much 
due to most liberals wishing for it. Rather, it emerged in part from a mis-
calculation in the strategy used to entrench liberal rights, combined with 
a gradual recognition that the best way to manage democracy’s seem-
ingly unavoidable rise was to limit and control it as best they could. As it 
happened, the advent of extensive, and eventually universal, suffrage did 
not result in the calamities that many liberals had worried about. Writing 
at the turn of the century, the author of Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy 
observed that before universal suffrage ‘there were many fears about the 
bad influence of their [the excluded masses’] vote on the government, but 
there were no fears that they would not immediately and fully exercise 
the privilege conferred on them’.48 Liberals only became more convinced 
supporters of democracy once it was demonstrated that it was not the 
great threat to individual rights it was thought to be, and the extension of 
the franchise had proven to be relatively palatable. To summarise, there 
was little preordained in the modern composite ‘liberal democracy’ that 
emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
In considering the historically specific nature of liberal democracy, one 
must further note that this union was not, by any means, an even one. It 
may be the case that democracy can be traced back to ancient Greece, but 
in the modern era it was liberalism that came first, and would structure 
the subsequent reappearance of democracy. The result has been that in 
the liberal democratic model which has appeared in the West and is now 
promoted widely, ‘liberalism is its absolute premise and foundation and 
penetrates and shapes its democratic character’.49 This point is fundamen-
tal. Even if one accepts the position that democracy and liberalism are 
necessary partners – which is questionable on both historical and theoret-
ical grounds – the way the two components have been reconciled in the 
model now prominent was not logically inevitable, but historically deter-
mined. Liberalism has shaped democracy, being the dominant  partner 
47. Ibid., 256–7.
48. Edwin Lawrence Godkin, Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy (Westminster: 
Archibald Constable & Co., 1898), 60–1.
49. Bhikhu Parekh, ‘The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy’, in 
 Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West, ed. David Held (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1993), 156–76, 157.
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in this relationship. A representative example of this is the  institution of 
the secret ballot: an individual’s involvement in the exercise of political 
power through electing his or her representatives is no longer a com-
munal act, but something private, as individuals are totally atomised in 
their participation. Within this prevailing model of liberal democracy, 
liberalism provides the confines within which democracy exists. There 
is no reason logically speaking, however, why this should necessarily be 
the case. The composite nature of liberal democracy suggests it is open to 
various possible formations, depending to some extent on how each of its 
two parts is understood and incorporated. To begin with, alternate mod-
els of liberal democracy could be based on an equal weighting between 
the two components, or democracy instead playing the hegemonic role. 
Indeed, it is most likely that different forms of liberal democracy would 
garner more support and traction in non-Western environments where 
different conceptions of the individual and community exist.50 This is not 
to mention alternative models of democracy beyond the liberal frame-
work, which likewise could be much more applicable in other settings. 
The larger point is that even if one accepts the (contestable) proposition 
that the liberal model represents the most viable form of democracy in 
the current politico-economic environment, there is still considerable 
space for difference within it.
By recognising that liberal democracy as found in the West, most 
prominently in the United States, is a historically contingent and par-
ticular form, the teleological and universalist account of democracy 
that underpins the liberal millenarian position is brought into ques-
tion. Like all other forms of rule, liberal democracy is a system of gov-
ernment that emerged in a historical context to answer a set of political 
questions unique to that time.51 The liberal democratic model that now 
prevails is one which has emerged from the West over the last centu-
ries and necessarily reflects this heritage. Of particular importance is 
that this variant, which strongly emphasises the liberties and freedom 
of the individual, is the result of a specific set of historical contingen-
cies, where liberalism was fighting the prevailing collectivist world-
view that had preceded it.52
Liberalism’s conception of the individual and society is very distinc-
tive, and one that is different from historically prevalent understandings, 
even within the West.53 In this regard, Parekh observes that ‘different 
societies define and individuate people differently. They also there-
fore define freedom, equality, rights, property, justice, loyalty, power 
50. Ibid., 172.
51. Ankersmit, Political Representation, 92–3.
52. Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Sigmund, The Democratic Experience: Past and 
Prospects (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969), 79–80.
53. Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984), 8.
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and authority differently.’54 The Western tradition of liberalism, and 
thus the liberal democratic model that stems from it, provides one set 
of answers to these questions. In considering alternate conceptions of 
democracy within Africa, Bradley notes that it is ‘a configuration of gov-
ernance moulded by the general values, biases, and nuances of a given 
culture’.55 This observation is borne out in the United States and Western 
Europe, where the specific kind of liberal democracy to emerge there is 
not  natural, but  diachronically conditioned. Through a more historically 
sensitive appraisal of this version of democracy, space is opened up for 
forms of democracy promotion that are more aware of different cultural 
and historical contexts. It may be the case that alternate versions of liberal 
democracy, or perhaps even non-liberal or post-liberal models of democ-
racy, may be better suited to these diverse circumstances. Furthermore, 
recognising the contextuality of this model points towards examining the 
differences, or the gap, between the specific circumstances in which it 
first appeared, and the locales within which liberal democracy is now 
being practised and promoted.
In highlighting that liberalism and democracy are not a natural or inev-
itable pairing, as well as the particularity of the liberal democratic model 
now prominent, this allows for a more complex conception of democracy 
in terms of its past. In so doing, an even more basic observation, too often 
lost, comes to the fore: it is not only liberal democracy which is relatively 
new; the existing consensus over democracy as a good is also remarkably 
recent, unique to the present age and far from natural or inevitable:
Democracy Before Liberalism
Democracy has always been the naughty boy in the School of Ages, so he has 
had to bear the blame of anything done wrong, as a king beheaded or a city 
burnt; but he is getting old enough to defend himself, and will probably give 
us some new versions.56
Harwood’s observation nicely represents the change in democracy’s 
meaning and significance which was taking place at the close of the 19th 
century: a new, liberal version was emerging, as the historically domi-
nant verdict against democracy was slowly being overthrown. This 
movement proved so successful that the long-standing interpretation 
of democracy as unworkable and undesirable has been almost totally 
eclipsed. When considered over the longue durée, however, it quickly 
becomes apparent that the current normative agreement over democracy 
is a historically rare result. From this perspective the liberal interpreta-
tion is inverted. Instead of emphasis being on the inevitable ‘triumph’ 
54. Parekh, ‘The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy’, 169.
55. Matthew Todd Bradley, ‘“The Other”: Precursory African Conceptions of 
Democracy’, International Studies Review 7, no. 3 (2005): 407–31, 407.
56. George Harwood, The Coming Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1882), 40.
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of  liberal  democracy, a position Fukuyama still strongly maintains,57 it is 
on the historically dominant narrative of democracy as unworkable, unde-
sirable and antiquated: something that should be permanently consigned 
to the trash bin of history. Foregrounding this dimension of democracy’s 
past allows us to consider matters from a different perspective, one that 
is much more attuned to the complexities and fragility of democracy. It 
leaves us better equipped not only to comprehend the limitations and 
antinomies in established liberal democracies, but also to appreciate the 
impact of different historical and cultural contexts on attempts to institute 
and promote democracy elsewhere. In this reading, the liberal millenar-
ian vision is replaced with a much more cautious perspective, founded 
in an awareness that for the vast majority of democracy’s long life it has 
been ignored, derided and denounced.
After the fleeting appearance of de¯mokratia in ancient Greece, democ-
racy effectively disappeared for the greater part of two millennia. 
 Athens, which was seen as the birthplace of democracy and the fullest 
embodiment of its meaning, seemingly left behind a long list of reasons 
advising against it: democracy was a violent, chaotic, unstable form of 
rule where those least capable of ruling wisely exercised power in a 
wilful and selfish manner. Athens would cast a very long shadow over 
democracy. When Edmund Burke castigated the French revolutionaries 
for what he perceived to be their misguided attempt to establish this 
form of rule, he would recall the Athenian experience: ‘until now, we 
have seen no examples of considerable democracies. The ancients were 
better acquainted with them.… If I recollect rightly, Aristotle observes, 
that a democracy has many striking points of resemblance with a 
tyranny.’58 Indeed, the writings of Aristotle, along with Thucydides 
and Plato especially – all taken as reliable, insightful eyewitnesses to 
democracy’s failings – proved to be very influential in producing nega-
tive interpretations.59 Even if their thought was much more ambiguous 
on the matter, it was collectively read as providing extremely strong 
evidence against democracy. In History of the Peloponnesian War it was 
the voice of Alcibiades that spoke loudest, describing Athenian democ-
racy as an ‘acknowledged folly’, with Hobbes stating in the introduc-
tion to his translation that ‘for his [Thucydides’] opinion touching the 
government of the state … it is manifest that he least of all liked the 
democracy’.60
57. Francis Fukuyama, ‘They Can Only Go So Far’, Washington Post, 24/8/08, 
B01.
58. Edmund Burke, Select Works of Edmund Burke, Volume 2 (Indianapolis: 
 Liberty Fund, 1999), 94.
59. Jennifer Roberts, Athens on Trial: the Antidemocratic Tradition in Western 
Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
60. Thomas Hobbes, Thucydides, ed. Richard Schlatter (New Brunswick:  Rutgers 
University Press, 1975), 13–14, 6.89.6.
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In considering the Athenian legacy, it is very important to recover the 
original connotations of the term de¯mokratia, which have been obscured 
by the tendency to translate it simply as the people (de¯mos) exercising 
power (kratos). While de¯mos can be read as being the whole political com-
munity, it was generally understood in a more narrow sense as one class 
of people: the poor multitude. This interpretation was found notably in 
authors such as Plato and Aristotle, and would structure the concept of 
democracy well into the 19th century.61 Kratos, meanwhile, has a forceful 
and almost violent dimension to its meaning that has been wholly lost. 
The term kratos ‘refers to might, strength, imperial majesty, toughness, 
triumphant power, and victory over others, especially through the appli-
cation of force’.62 This meant, as Keane explains, ‘in a de¯mokratia the de¯mos 
holds kratos, which was another way of saying that it is prone to act force-
fully, to get its own particular way by using violence, either against itself 
but especially against others’.63 What were thus taken as the defining 
 elements of the Athenian experience – the direct and forceful exercise of 
power in a small polity by the poor many – formed the backbone of com-
plaints and concerns which condemned democracy to disuse and irrel-
evance for centuries. Emblematic was the vivid description of democracy 
provided by a British High Court judge writing in the late 19th century: 
It is the poor saying to the rich, ‘We are masters now, by the establishment 
of liberty, which means democracy, and as all men are brothers, entitled to 
share and share alike in the common stock, we will make you disgorge or we 
will put you to death.’64 
This kind of interpretation in part reflected that, from the ancient Greeks 
onwards, the great canon of Western political thought was almost united 
in their rejection of democracy. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, the philosophes, 
none spoke of it in directly positive terms. What marked democracy well 
into the late 18th century was a near universal consensus over it being 
perceived as something unfeasible and undesirable. At the time, democ-
racy remained not much more than a scholarly and antiquarian idea that 
had little purchase or relevance in politics.65
Considering this overwhelmingly negative perception of democracy, 
it is not surprising that the American and French Revolutions were not 
61. Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘Demos versus “We, the People”: Freedom and 
Democracy Ancient and Modern’, in De¯mokratia, eds. Josiah Ober and Charles 
Hedrick (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 126; Godkin, Unforeseen 
Tendencies of Democracy, 24.
62. John Keane, ‘Does Democracy Have a Violent Heart?’, War, Culture and 
Democracy Project Conference, The University of Sydney, 4–6/7/06, 15.
63. Ibid., 16.
64. James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Three Brief Essays, 
reprinted edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 175.
65. Pierre Rosanvallon ‘The History of the Word “Democracy” in France’, 
 Journal of Democracy 6, no 4 (1995): 140–54.
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primarily about democracy, despite the retrospective significance given 
to them as ‘democratic revolutions’.66 Democracy still meant de¯mokratia: 
a direct form of social rule, inapplicable and inappropriate to the mod-
ern context these revolutions were occurring in. In America, the Found-
ing Fathers, well versed in the classics, were at pains to ensure that the 
United States would not become a democracy. Madison clearly stated 
the prevailing view in the Federalist Papers: ‘democracies have ever been 
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incom-
patible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have, in 
general, been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their 
deaths’.67 These failings were seen as stemming largely from the direct 
nature of Athenian rule, in comparison to the representative republic 
the Americans sought to institute. The founders of the United States fol-
lowed in a long tradition of political thought which regarded an unmixed 
democracy as inappropriate and dangerous. During the American consti-
tutional convention Benjamin Rush reminded his colleagues of this view-
point: ‘a simple democracy has been aptly compared … to a volcano that 
contained within its bowels the fiery materials of its own destruction’.68 
When establishing the United States the founders did not see themselves 
as instituting a democracy. That the modern world’s most fabled democ-
racy actively denied this label little over two hundred years ago offers a 
stark reminder of just how recently the term has come to signify some-
thing positive.
Similarly, the French revolutionaries of 1789 largely avoided the 
 concept of democracy. The classical meaning still dominated the imagi-
naries of those seeking to restore, reform or overthrow the ancien régime. 
Democracy continued to conjure up images of an archaic form of rule 
found in city-states marked by instability and unrest; something com-
pletely inappropriate and impossible for a large, modern nation like 
France. In this regard, representative is the thought of Abbé de Sieyes, 
author of the catalysing What is the Third Estate? and one of the most 
central political actors in the first stages of the Revolution. Sieyes still 
understood democracy as a direct form of rule only possible in a pol-
ity of very limited size, leading him to state in unequivocal terms that, 
66. See R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: The Challenge 
( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) and The Age of the Democratic Revolu-
tion: The Struggle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). For an extended 
discussion on these cases, see Christopher Hobson, Democracy and International 
 Politics: A Conceptual History (Unpublished PhD Dissertation,  Australian National 
University, 2009).
67. James Madison, ‘10th Federalist Paper’, in The Federalist (The Gideon 
Edition), ed. George Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
2001), 42–9, 46.
68. Quoted in Leslie Lipson, The Democratic Civilization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1964), 45.
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‘I always maintain that France is not, and cannot be a democracy.’69 When 
the Revolution was further radicalised, it was primarily the language 
of republicanism, and not that of democracy, which prevailed.70 None-
theless, the Revolution was seen by many observers as a seriously mis-
guided attempt to institute a democracy. In his famous polemic, Burke 
noted that, ‘I do not know under what description to class the present 
ruling authority in France. It affects to be a pure democracy’.71 Dur-
ing and after the Revolution democracy became closely linked to the 
excesses of the Jacobins and the Terror. Reflecting half a century later, 
Giuseppe Mazzini observed that people ‘no sooner hear the name of 
democracy than the phantom of ’93 rises immediately before them. With 
them democracy is a guillotine surmounted by a red cap.’72 Events in 
France were widely taken as unnecessary confirmation that democracy 
was a dangerous, anarchic form inappropriate for modern conditions, 
one where the base and violent passions of the mob prevailed, until it 
descended into complete chaos, only to be rescued by a ruler even more 
absolute than the monarchs of the ancien régime. Writing to William Wil-
berforce, John Jay summed up prevailing sentiment: ‘The French revolu-
tion has so discredited democracy … that I doubt its giving you much 
more trouble.’73 
Jay’s prediction proved accurate for much of the 19th century: democ-
racy continued to be viewed in largely negative terms, with only a hand-
ful of radicals willing to speak of it positively. During the revolutions 
of 1848, there was a considerable spike in the discussion and usage of 
democracy, but it was much more closely linked to the radical positions 
of socialism and communism. Complaining of the events in France, 
Guizot described democracy as ‘the echo of an ancient social war-cry’, 
continuing that:
It is the chaos of our political ideas and our political morality – that chaos dis-
guised sometimes under the word democracy, sometimes under that of equal-
ity, sometimes under that of people – which opens all the gates, and throws 
down all the ramparts of society before it.74
69. Quoted in Murray Forsyth, Reason and Revolution: The Political Thought of 
Abbé Sieyes (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987), 138.
70. Despite the common concerns these two doctrines share, it is important to 
recognise that they are historically distinct. On this point, see: Giovanni Sartori, 
Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 262–3.
71. Burke, Select Works of Edmund Burke, 94.
72. Giuseppe Mazzini, Thoughts upon Democracy in Europe (1846–1847) (Centro 
Editoriale Toscano, 2001), 4.
73. Quoted in Regina Ann Morkell Morantz, ‘Democracy’ and ‘Republic’ in 
 American Ideology (1787–1840) (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Columbia Univer-
sity, 1971), 149.
74. François Guizot, Democracy in France, Third Edition (London: John Murray, 
1849), 19, 35.
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Democracy retained the menacing connotations of old, threatening social 
unrest and turmoil. Notably, in the famous Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, Marx and Engels stated that, ‘the first step in the revolution by 
the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class 
to win the battle of democracy’.75 As discussed above, democracy was 
later reconciled with liberalism, but at this time, democracy was further 
stigmatised by being much more closely associated with socialism and 
communism. The classical interpretation of democracy as a social form 
of rule was reiterated, only now it was the growing working classes that 
warned against its institution.
Even when Woodrow Wilson was attempting to ‘make the world safe 
for democracy’,76 it was far from being fully accepted – in either institu-
tional or normative terms – by the very countries fighting in democracy’s 
name. The Entente Powers reconciled themselves to Wilson’s democratic 
war aims very gradually and grudgingly. Arthur Ponsonby, one of the 
founders of the Union of Democratic Control, established in Great Britain 
in 1914 to pressure for the extension of democracy to the realm of foreign 
affairs, feared that the Great War would strengthen anti-democratic forces 
at home. He worriedly wrote that, ‘democracy may have to fight over 
some of the old ground again before it can hope to advance further’.77 Pon-
sonby’s fears were not without foundation, given that the British embrace 
of democracy at the end of the 19th century was a hesitant and incomplete 
one.78 Indeed, it was not until 1918 that all men over the age of 21, as well 
as women over 30, were granted the right to vote in Great Britain. 
Reflecting the limited normative purchase democracy had secured were 
these comments by Sir William Ridgeway, a noted Cambridge classics pro-
fessor, published in The Times in 1915: ‘a modern world filled only with 
democratic States would be like a stagnant pond in some shady spot in 
which no higher animal forms could live but overflowing with all the lower 
and baser forms of life’.79 Nonetheless, with Wilson memorably framing 
the Allied war aims in terms of democracy, followed by their subsequent 
victory and the near universal extension of the franchise in many democra-
cies, as well as it being instituted in some places for the first time, the nor-
75. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘The Manifesto of the Communist Party’, 
1848. <http://www.newyouth.com/archives/classics/marxengels/communist-
manifesto.html>, accessed 27/8/08.
76. Woodrow Wilson, ‘The World Must be Made Safe for Democracy’, in 
A Day of Dedication: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Woodrow Wilson, ed. 
Albert Fried (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 308.
77. Arthur Ponsonby, Democracy and Diplomacy (London: Methuen & Co, 1915), 
110–11.
78. Jon Roper, Democracy and its Critics: Anglo-American democratic thought in 
the nineteenth century (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 21; Canfora, Democracy in 
Europe, 101–3.
79. Quoted in Ponsonby, Democracy and Diplomacy, 111.
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mative and political rehabilitation of democracy in the West was advanced 
considerably. ‘After 1919 democratic values were  increasingly accepted as 
a kind of ideological equivalent to the coin of the realm’, Mayall observes, 
‘even if circumstances prevented it from being minted in most parts of the 
world.’80 This is not to deny that the subsequent rise of fascism posed a fun-
damental challenge to democracy, nevertheless it was in the early decades 
of the 20th century that democracy took on the positive evaluative dimen-
sion that it has yet to lose in the West to this day.
What this brief genealogy of democracy indicates is quite how recent 
and unlikely the current normative consensus over democracy is. It was 
not until the 1840s that democracy had clearly been rehabilitated in Ameri-
can political discourse,81 and it would take at least another half-century for 
other major Western liberal democracies to start following suit in discursive 
and institutional terms. It was only with Woodrow Wilson giving democ-
racy pride of place during World War I that it fully emerged as a positive 
political concept, even if contestation over its meaning and value has since 
continued. Seen in this light, which shows the historical durability of the 
unflattering and negative interpretation of democracy, it is remarkable how 
quick liberals are to view it in an ahistorical, universal manner. It is also 
worth noting, though, that far from corresponding to Gallie’s now com-
monplace description of democracy as an ‘essentially contested concept’,82 
democracy has been for most of its life essentially uncontested. For the 
greater part of two millennia there was a very high level of consensus over 
democracy, and this was wholly negative: it was considered a dangerous, 
unstable, violent and antiquated form of rule. Democracy was long dis-
missed and derided as a foolhardy adventure that could only end in disas-
ter. It is only in the last two centuries that the ‘descriptive’ and ‘evaluative’ 
dimensions of democracy have been contested, challenged and changed.83
Democracy’s Futures Past?
In essence, a ‘radical historicisation’ of democracy is based on a recogni-
tion of ‘how brief and slight the impress of democracy upon the course of 
human history’ has been.84 This approach enables a much more  reflexive 
position, with an acknowledgement of the vicissitudes of history and 
80. James Mayall, ‘Democracy and International Society’, International Affairs 
76, no. 1 (2000): 61–75, 64.
81. Morantz, ‘Democracy’ and ‘Republic’ in American Ideology.
82. W. B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1964), 157–91.
83. For a discussion on the ‘descriptive’ and ‘evaluative’ dimensions of con-
cepts, see Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics. Volume 1: Regarding Method (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 145–57.
84. John Hobson, Democracy and a Changing Civilisation (London: John Lane and 
the Bodley Head, 1934), 1.
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the frailties of democracy informing how we appreciate the role it plays 
in international politics. By recognising the relatively short  historical 
agreement on democracy as something possible and desirable, it pro-
motes both humility and caution, in contrast to the overly optimistic 
and confident attitude that defines liberal millenarianism. In this sense, 
the argument here shares some commonalities with Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
classic, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness.85 What Niebuhr 
sought to do was separate the larger idea of democracy from the specific 
liberal form with which it has been so closely identified over the last 
century. In the foreword, Niebuhr explains that:
The thesis of this volume … grew out of my conviction that democracy has 
a more compelling justification and requires a more realistic vindication 
than is given it by the liberal culture with which it has been associated in 
modern history. The excessively optimistic estimates of human nature and 
of human history with which the democratic credo has been historically 
associated are a source of peril to democratic society; for contemporary 
experience is refuting this optimism and there is danger that it will seem to 
refute the democratic as well.86
Without necessarily subscribing to Niebuhr’s distinctive brand of 
 Christian realism, one can recognise that by detaching democracy from 
liberalism, as part of taking a more reflexive approach to appreciating 
democracy and its history, a more secure foundation for it can be built.
Through inverting the liberal millenarian account of democracy and 
its past, an important dimension recovered centres on the unstable and 
uncertain nature of this form of rule. While this has historically been 
used as an argument against democracy, it can be the basis for a more 
reflective case for democracy. In the classical interpretation democracy 
was seen as especially susceptible to collapse, as there was no protection 
from the whims of the wilful, passionate, erratic de¯mos, liable to change 
their minds as often as the wind changed. An interesting variation on 
this perspective surprisingly comes from a number of conservative think-
ers in the 19th century. Reflecting on Athens, the reactionary Joseph de 
Maistre still can admit that, ‘democracy has one brilliant moment’, before 
carefully qualifying his statement: ‘but it is one moment, and it is neces-
sary to pay dearly for it.… In general, all democratic governments are 
only transient meteors, whose brilliance excludes durations.’87 Notewor-
thy is that a thinker such as de Maistre acknowledges positives in the 
democratic form, discounting it partly on the grounds that it is never able 
85. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (London: 
Nisbet & Co., 1945).
86. Ibid., v.
87. Joseph de Maistre, Against Rousseau: ‘On the State of Nature’ and ‘On the 
Sovereignty of the People, trans. Richard A. Lebrun (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1996), 159–60.
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to be  properly institutionalised or stabilised, as the de¯mos is an inchoate 
grouping unable to fully manifest itself or its will.88 Writing half a century 
later, Henry Sumner Maine echoed de Maistre’s observations, noting that 
‘of all the forms of government, Democracy is by far the most difficult’ and 
this primarily accounted for its ‘ephemeral duration’.89 Another conser-
vative that complained of the complexity of democracy was Metternich. 
He explained to an American friend that, ‘democracy, far from being the 
oldest and simplest form of government, as it is often maintained, is the 
last of all to have been invented and the most complicated’.90 What united 
both Maine and Metternich was a belief that proponents did not seriously 
reflect on the problems and difficulties democracy entailed. Maine com-
plained, ‘convinced partisans of democracy care little for instances which 
show democratic governments to be unstable. These are merely isolated 
triumphs of the principle of evil.’91 Maine’s problem with the emerging 
representative form of democracy was its complexity, and, moreover, 
that it could only be achieved in an incomplete and limited sense, as it 
was not genuinely possible for the de¯mos to exercise power in a large 
society, even indirectly.92 This contradiction created great potential for 
instability in Maine’s view. For these highly sceptical observers, regard-
less of any potential benefits democracy may provide, the complexities 
and difficulties of this form of rule strongly warned against it.
Modern democracy has proven these conservative critics wrong, dem-
onstrating that a stable and lasting form of democracy is possible, with 
the representative system functioning to institute, construct and medi-
ate the will of the de¯mos. At the same stage, the people and their will 
are always approximated, but never fully manifest. While one can make 
strong normative and historical arguments that representation is demo-
cratic,93 the ‘gap’ it introduces between the people and its representa-
tives marks an ongoing tension, if not antinomy, at modern democracy’s 
heart. The result, as Ankersmit explains, is that ‘representative democ-
racy is a far more subtle, sophisticated, and therefore also a far more 
vulnerable political system than we tend to believe’.94 Undoubtedly, this 
88. It is in this sense that de Maistre defined democracy as ‘an association of men 
without sovereignty’. Ibid., 142.
89. Henry Sumner Maine, Popular Government: Four Essays (London: John 
 Murray, 1886), 87–8.
90. Quoted in G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, Metternich and his Times, trans. Peter 
Ryde (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1962), 39.
91. Maine, Popular Government, 20–1.
92. Ibid., 89.
93. Christopher Hobson, ‘Revolution, Representation and the Foundations of 
Modern Democracy’, European Journal of Political Theory 7, no. 4 (2008): 465–87; 
Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2006); Ankersmit, Political Representation.
94. Ankersmit, Political Representation, 230–1.
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 vulnerability is multiplied by the complexities of (post-)modern society. 
For instance, the grave and extensive challenges posed to current democ-
racies by globalisation have been well detailed.95 Notable is the manner 
in which these changes have further exacerbated problems in regards to 
questions of representation, accountability, access and the power people 
have in existing democracies. Given the huge array of challenges and 
dilemmas that even the most well established and secure democracies 
are now struggling with, the historically long-standing concerns with 
democracy’s fragility and lack of permanence do not seem completely 
out of place. In this regard, notable commentators such as Crouch and 
Wolin have suggested that we may be entering a ‘post-democratic’ era, 
while John Keane’s major new study on democracy is ominously titled, 
The Life and Death of Democracy.96 Within the liberal millennarian vision, 
however, the underlying teleological conception of history limits how 
democracy is conceived of, preventing the possibility of seriously engag-
ing with these kinds of issues, and, most basically, considering whether 
the future of democracy may end up being more like most of its past. 
Instead, liberals cling vainly to a narrative of linear democratic progress 
and expansion, despite already significant, and still growing, evidence to 
the contrary.
Conservative sceptics warned against democracy because its com-
plexities suggested it was bound to fail. Liberal millenarians, meanwhile, 
tend to comfortably assume a linear, progressive expansion of democracy 
will continue. Neither position is satisfactory: one too pessimistic, the 
other too confident. What can be taken from the conservatives, though, 
is a recognition that any form of democracy is very difficult to institute 
and maintain. This suggests humility and reflexivity where democracy 
exists, and great caution if seeking to promote or extend it elsewhere. The 
complex nature of democracy prevents it from being easily transported 
or imposed.97 Furthermore, the culturally specific and historically con-
ditioned nature of liberal democracy means that it is not something that 
necessarily can or should be exported. At the same time, these challenges 
are most certainly not enough to dismiss this unique form of rule. Liberals 
are on much stronger ground in pointing to modern democracy’s com-
95. The literature is vast, but a key starting point remains David Held, Democracy 
and the Global Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
96. Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Sheldon S. Wolin, 
Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarian-
ism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); John Keane, The Life and Death 
of Democracy (forthcoming).
97. This has increasingly been recognised in the more critical post-conflict 
reconstruction literature. For example, see: Roland Paris, ‘International Peace-
building and the “Mission Civilisatrice”’, Review of International Studies 28, no. 4 
(2002): 637–56; Oliver Richmond, ‘The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 
“Liberal Peace”’, Conflict, Security & Development 6, no. 3 (2006): 291–314.
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parative successes at providing basic human goods. Liberal  millenarians, 
however, have been too quick to see these achievements more in absolute 
than relative terms.
History points towards there being nothing natural or inevitable about 
the present importance we attach to democracy or the manner in which 
we practice it. While things may stay the same, the past suggests that 
democracy’s meaning and value will alter again in the future, as it has 
done previously. For instance, in much the same way that the current rec-
onciliation between liberalism and democracy is due to historical circum-
stances, there is potential that in the future liberals may again separate 
themselves from democracy, if it is felt that this regime type no longer 
protects and supports basic liberal rights. In the meantime, the ongoing 
tensions which arise from the combining of liberalism and democracy in 
the model of liberal democracy now dominant are not ones that can be 
easily overcome, with the pressures of globalisation and (post-) modern 
society having great potential to further exacerbate these fault lines. 
Indeed, how present-day democracies deal with these significant chal-
lenges facing them, combined with how prudently and successfully they 
seek to promote this form of rule abroad, will help to shape and influence 
the way democracy is understood and valued in the future. Simply put, 
by removing the liberal blinkers that continue to inhibit the way we con-
ceive of democracy, we can see that even if a level of democracy has been 
achieved in some places, this cannot be taken for granted, or presumed 
to be something that will necessarily continue into the future. If anything, 
history suggests the opposite is much more likely. And through recognis-
ing this, it allows for a perspective much more attuned to the gravity of 
the difficulties that democracy now faces, and thus better equipped to 
deal with these challenges.
Conclusions
It has been argued that the contingency and contextuality of democracy 
has been lost in the progressive reading of its history which now domi-
nates our mental horizons. This constructed historical narrative plays an 
important role in shaping contemporary practices. Alternative versions 
of democracy are foreclosed, as the liberal model is seen as applicable to 
all. A remarkable feature that defines most of the literature and practice 
of democracy promotion and democratisation is the lack of serious con-
sideration on democracy’s variations and contestability, with it too often 
being taken to necessarily mean the liberal subtype. This is combined 
with a general refusal to consider whether, indeed, the liberal form is 
the most appropriate version of democracy to be encouraged; presuming 
that democracy promotion is even something democratic states and the 
international community should be engaging in. Meanwhile, antinomies 
and tensions within this specific version of democracy are papered over 
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or ignored, as it is regarded as an achieved state and a natural  condition 
in the Western core, bolstered by a presumption that this situation will 
not drastically change in the future. Universalising democracy in this 
manner, however, tries to depoliticise it by removing from consider-
ation such foundational questions as: ‘What is democracy?’, ‘What can 
it mean?’, ‘What kind of democracy is best in each given environment?’, 
‘Are there democratic alternatives to the liberal model?’ and most basi-
cally, ‘Is democracy necessarily the best form of rule?’ Instead, history is 
seen to provide the answer: liberal democracy. Clearly this move is, in 
itself, deeply political by seeking to legitimate a specific vision of democ-
racy, and, with it, a certain set of actors and policies, while simultane-
ously limiting the possibilities for different conceptions of democracy.
Through the liberal millenarian framework stable liberal democracies, 
having reached ‘the end of history’, are regarded as morally superior, 
with increasing calls that this self-designated status should give them spe-
cial rights in international society. To take an important example of this 
thinking, in the United States there has been wide-ranging support for 
the formation of a ‘league’ or ‘alliance’ of democracies. One of the major 
proposals of the recent Princeton Report on US National Security was 
the creation of a ‘Concert of Democracies’, which would be ‘a new global 
institution dedicated to the principles underpinning liberal democracy, 
both as a vehicle to spur and support the reform of the United Nations 
and other global institutions and as a possible alternative to them’.98 In a 
similar vein, Buchanan and Keohane suggest that if the United Nations 
Security Council proves unworkable, a ‘democratic coalition’ should be 
granted special privileges in determining the use of force in international 
politics because of their ‘comparative moral reliability’.99 In these promi-
nent proposals liberal democracies are taken as more legitimate due to 
their comparative or absolute moral ‘goodness’. Underwriting these 
claims is a teleological conception of history: ‘post-historical states’ that 
have achieved liberal democracy are more advanced, and thus more enti-
tled to special rights and privileges than those ‘still stuck in history’.100 In 
part, what this article has sought to show is quite how unjustifiable the 
historical grounds for arguments such as these are.
By moving beyond ‘the end of history’ and towards a ‘radical historici-
sation’ of democracy, an alternative vision is forged, one that is explicitly 
more open and more political. In looking forward, we do so cognisant 
98. G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty 
Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International Affairs, 2006), 25.
99. Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, ‘The Preventative Use of Force: A 
 Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal’, Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 1 
(2004): 1–22, 18–20.
100. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 276.
 at Aberystwyth University on February 19, 2013mil.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Hobson: Beyond the End of History
 657
of what has come before, aware that democracy is not preordained by 
history, nature or humankind. Democracy is a fragile, uncertain, fluctu-
ating form, and, over the longue durée, it has been much more defined by 
its failures and its impermanence, than the opposite. Both democracy’s 
meaning and the value we now attach to it are neither determined nor 
fixed. They have changed and shifted diachronically, and this situation 
will undoubtedly continue into the future. Furthermore, the present pair-
ing of democracy and liberalism is one brought about through specific 
historical circumstances and there are no guarantees this relationship 
will continue indefinitely. By adopting a historically sensitive position 
it leads to a more pluralist appreciation of contemporary democracy and 
its future possibilities. It suggests that if we value democracy, we must 
continue to explore, confront and renovate what it means. This is nec-
essarily an ongoing process, one informed by – but most definitely not 
limited to – historical reflection. In this sense, it also points towards a 
much broader notion of ‘democracy promotion’, meaning something that 
takes place wherever democracy is discussed, debated, challenged and 
reflected upon in an open, engaged and continuous manner. From this 
perspective the potential for transcending misplaced self-satisfaction in 
democracy as being achieved is offered. It is no longer something ‘we’ 
have to promote elsewhere. Rather, democracy remains an unstable, 
precarious and incomplete form, with history providing no assurances 
that the current democratic moment will last. While past and present suc-
cesses provide us with a degree of hope; the antinomies, limits and short-
comings that mark even the most secure democracies suggests humility, 
counselling an awareness of the contingency and potential imperma-
nence of the present normative and political ascendancy of this unique 
and rare form of rule.
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